There was a party at Todd's house last week at which various movies were discussed. When dinner was over, the guests considered several ways to entertain themselves. In the end, (1) everyone at the party voted to watch a movie that Phil said was his favorite.
Let's assume that somehow or other indefinites receive an existential interpretation. In that case, the phrase a movie that Phil said was his favorite indicates existential quantification over movies that Phil said were his favorite. Let's also assume that Phil has only one favorite movie and that that is the one he told us about. In that case, the restrictor of this existential quantifier has a singleton extension. Let's call an indefinite of this kind a 'singleton indefinite'.
While singleton indefinites as just defined may not have any particularly special grammatical properties, they do have some noteworthy logical properties. To begin with, although singleton indefinites are existentially quantified, they are nearly scopeless. Under the circumstances described above, (1) is truth conditionally equivalent to (2): (2) A movie that Phil said was his favorite was such that everyone at the party voted to watch it.
Similarly, (3) is truth conditionally equivalent to (4)
No one had read most of the reviews that were written about a movie that Phil said was his favorite.
(4) There was a movie that Phil said was his favorite but noone had read most of the reviews that were written about it.
The reason singleton indefinites are scopeless is that, like singular definites, they are essentially namelike. The quickest way to see this is to consider the standard generalized quantifier meaning for a singleton indefinite and that of a name. Suppose that White Dust was the movie that Phil said was his favorite. Then a movie that Phil said was his favorite will denote the set of all sets containing some movie Phil said was his favorite, which in this case will just be the s et of sets containing White Dust which is just the generalized quantifier meaning of White Dust. This means that if singleton indefinites aren't actual referring expressions they are pretty close to being referential. Like names they 'speak about' a single entity.
The general thesis to be explored here is as follows: the special properties of singleton indefinites have led to the mistaken belief that indefinites have readings in addition to or instead of run of the mill existential readings. The particular thesis in this section is that so-called 'referential indefinites' are just singleton indefinites. Fodor and Sag (1982) defend the idea that indefinites are ambiguous between a quantification interpretation on the one hand and an indexical, referential interpretation on the other. In their discussion of examples similar to (1) (see their examples 66-69) they in effect raise the very point made above, namely that singleton indefinites are by nature scopeless and that examples of this type would be no cause for positing an ambiguity 1 . What they claim, however, is that there are other cases where an indefinite is used and where its restrictor does not have a singleton extension but where referential readings are nevertheless possible. (5) below would likely count as an example of this type:
Everyone at the party voted to watch a movie that Phil liked.
Knowing Phil as I do, it is safe to assume that he likes more than one movie. Given this assumption, the object of watch appears not to be a singleton indefinite. Nevertheless, it does seem possible even under this assumption to understand (5) as being about a particular movie, which would mean it contains a 'referential' indefinite that is not a singleton. This description of (5) is almost accurate. What is missing is the possibility that being a quantifier, the existential is implicitly restricted. Compare this example to the following:
(6) Every movie that Phil liked had violence in it.
A natural interpretation of this example allows it to be true even if Phil has a fondness for violent and for non-violent films. This would the case, for example, if we understand the universal to be quantifying over movies that were discussed at the party. If we likewise understand the indefinite in (5) to be restricted to those movies that were relevant at the time or to those that the guests commented on when the issue of what to watch came up, it becomes more reasonable to entertain the possibility that we in fact are looking at another singleton indefinite.
The main thesis of this section can be summarized as follows. It is generally agreed that indefinites have an existential quantifier interpretation. It is also acknowledged that quantifiers have implicit restrictors. Putting these two together, it follows that, given the right context, any indefinite could in principle be a singleton indefinite. This accounts for the air of referentiality that attaches to some uses of indefinites. I should add that the general thesis has been suggested before by von Fintel(1999) , following unpublished work by Uli Sauerland. von Fintel elaborated this idea in much the same way as I do in this section and the one to follow.
Before embarking on our tour through the land of implicit restrictors and singleton quantifiers, we should lay out our terminological equipment to make sure we have what we need. The term singleton is applicable to any quantifier whose restrictor has a singleton extension. The restrictor includes overt material along with any implicit contextual restriction. Thinking of quantifiers as two-place relations, the restrictor is the whole of the first argument. So, I could say that a given occurrence of most mice is a singleton, if there is exactly one mouse under consideration at the time of utterance in the world of evaluation. What counts as 'under consideration' will be the topic of section IV below. The term 'referential' in quotes will be applied to an expression when it is clear what entity or individual is being referred to in the ordinary sense, without committing to the idea that the expression is a referring term in the technical sense. I will also use quotes to talk about apparent quantifier scope. One quantifier Q1may be said to have 'wide-scope' over another quantifier, Q2. This means that Q1 doesn't actually have wide-scope relative to Q2 on some syntactic level of logical form, however the relative scope of Q1 and Q2 is truth conditionally undetectable. I tend to use 'referential' and 'wide-scope', where the analyses I take issue with use the quoteless varieties.
II.
Quantified singleton restrictors.
An astute guest at the party happened to notice that:
(7) every boy voted for a movie that his mother said was her favorite.
Let's again assume that, like Phil, each of these mothers has only one favorite movie and that that was the one she mentioned. What that means is that for each value of the bound pronoun his, the indefinite a movie that his mother said was her favorite has a restrictor whose extension is a singleton: it includes just the one movie that that boy's mother likes best. Let's now redefine the term 'singleton indefinite' to include this case. A 'singleton indefinite' is an indefinite whose restrictor has a singleton extension, relative to each relevant assignment of values to any bound variables that might be in the restrictor. The indefinites discussed in the previous section are still singleton indefinites but now there are more cases to consider.
Again, I say that singleton indefinites are not particularly special from the point of view of the grammar, but they do have special logical properties. They are no longer always quasi-referential: (7) doesn't speak about a single movie, assuming there were several boys at the party. However, singleton indefinites do retain a degree of scopelessness not shared by most existentials. The scopelessness of a singleton indefinite extends up to the quantifier that binds variables in the restrictor. In (7), there are no other quantifiers besides the indefinite and the quantifier binding variables inside it, so there is nothing relative to which it could be scopeless. In order to see this effect we need an example like (8) below, which has the intervening quantifier, every adult. Note its truth conditional equivalence with (9), under the assumptions made concerning (7): (8) Every boy smiled at every adult who voted for a movie that his mother 1 said was her 1 favorite. (9) Every boy was such that there was a movie that his mother said was her favorite and he smiled at every adult who voted for it.
Similarly, under the assumption that everyone has one and only one favorite movie, (10) is truth conditionally equivalent to (11), and (12) is truth conditionally equivalent to (13):
(10) Everyone had read most of the reviews that were written about a movie that happened to be his favorite.
(11) For each person, there was a movie that was his favorite and he had read most of the reviews that were written about it.
(12) No boy was happy if he saw a movie that was his mother's favorite.
(13) There was no boy b, such that there was a movie that was his mother's favorite and he was happy if he saw that movie.
To say that these pairs are truth conditionally equivalent is, of course, just to say that that the truth conditions are unaffected by whether or not the indefinite takes scope above the intermediate quantifier or out of the antecedent of the conditional. It is not to say that the indefinite in (10) and (12) have been subjected to a scope-assigning mechanism, syntactic or otherwise, that fixes their scope above the preceding quantifier. That would seem impossible given what is known about how syntax constrains scope.
2 And yet, that is 2 Reinhart (1997) has a general review of this area. The facts relevant to (10) and (12)are that a quantifier can't take scope out of a relative clause or a conditional. In the pairs below, b. is not a possible reading of a:
(1) a. Some editor had read a review that was written about each of the movies. Below we will discuss some of these alternatives. For now, I want to state the main thesis of this section: apparent unexpected scope-taking by indefinites is just due to the presence of singleton indefinites. So in (8) for example, the indefinite appears to take intermediate scope, but this is just a funny fact related to its singleton status: no special quantification mechanism is warranted.
Again, as in the previous section, life is not as simple as I have presented it so far. The really compelling cases, the ones that actually appear in the literature, involve indefinites that don't on the face of it appear to be singleton indefinites.
3 Reinhart(1997:346) 's example (21), based on Ruys(1992) , is one such case: (14) Most linguists have looked at every analysis that solves some problem.
As Reinhart claims, (14) has a reading in which some problem takes scope above every analysis but below most linguists. In other words, for most linguists l, there is some problem p, presumably l's pet problem, and l knows every analysis that solves that problem. For this indefinite to take intermediate scope, it would have to have scope out of a relative clause which is generally forbidden. But this indefinite doesn't seem to fall neatly under the generalization that if an indefinite seems to take exceptional intermediate scope, it is just a singleton indefinite containing a bound variable.
In a recent paper devoted to quantifier domain restriction, Stanley and GendlerSzabó remind us that the implicit restriction on a quantifier may contain a bound variable. 4 The following examples illustrate this phenomenon:
(15) In most of John's classes, he fails exactly three Frenchmen. (Stanley & GendlerSzabó 2000:(24) ).
(16) Every farmer remembers at least one year when every crop failed.
3 Much of the really hard work in this area had to do with first establishing quantifier scope facts as a basis for studying the unique properties of indefinites and then getting a firm understanding of what those scope facts are. This turned out not to be as easy as it seems. The references I am aware of include: Abusch(1993-4) , Cormack and Kempson(1991) , Farkas(1981) , Fodor and Sag (1982) , King(1988) , Liu(1997) , Reinhart(1997) , Ruys(1992), and Winter(1997) .
(17) Many an overzealous linguist has at one time or another mistakenly believed that every outstanding problem could be solved by the correct application of the latest technical innovation.
(15) has a reading in which the set of Frenchmen quantified over varies with the choice of class. In (16), the set of crops, all of which are said to fail, can be understood to depend on the choice of farmer. In (17), the particular problems thought to be solvable will depend on the linguist. An innovation in phonology is believed to solve all outstanding phonology problems while a new technique for doing syntax is taken to be the cure-all for problems in syntax. Following the logic of the previous section, it is entirely possible that the indefinite in (14) has an implicit quantified restriction. Were we to spell out the implicit restriction, we might get something like the following:
(18) Most linguists have looked at every analysis that solves some problem that they have worked on most extensively.
What we have now done is to make apparent the bound variable in the restrictor of the indefinite. In so doing, we have revealed another singleton indefinite.
Here are the main points of the argument. Indefinites express existential quantification. The restrictor of a natural language quantifier consists of overt and sometimes implicit material. In some cases, either the overt or the covert part contains bound variables 5 . The extension of this restrictor could be arbitrarily small relative to values of the bound variables. The limiting case is the singleton indefinite. It follows then that in principle any indefinite could be a singleton indefinite, hence we should expect to find apparent unexpected scope-taking by indefinites. If no bound variable is involved, the indefinite will be appear to take widest scope, if a bound variable is involved, it's scope will appear to reach up to and possibly beyond the quantifier binding the variable in question. The indefinite's scope will appear to reach beyond the quantifier binding into it when the indefinite not only has a singleton extension relative to all relevant values for the bound variable, but where that extension is the same in every case. Cresti(1995:66,198) The indefinite in (22) is scopeless relative to the conditional, if it is read de-re (with the world variable w assigned the utterance world) but not if it is read de-dicto, with the world variable bound by the conditional:
(23) Let: w' be a world in which a movie I like best in w' is playing at the Rialto and which is the closest such world to the actual world w a . Then: I will go to see the movie in w'.
III. Other quantifiers.
Our focus so far has been on singleton indefinites, existential quantifiers whose restrictor has a singleton extension. What can we say about singleton occurrences of quantifiers with other than existential force? Let's begin with some possibly amusing logical facts. Singleton universals behave just like singleton indefinites. Sticking to simple cases, where no bound variables are involved, singleton universals are also namelike. Provided the information conveyed in the since clause of (24) below is correct, the underlined part is truth conditionally equivalent to (25) In a moment, we will discuss the differences between (26) or (28) and (27) and between (25). Keeping our eyes narrowly focused on truth conditions for the time being, we quickly note a few more facts. If there is just one golden mountain, then less than two golden mountains will be a singleton and it will combine with a verb phrase to yield only true statements while the singleton more than two golden mountains will yield only false statements. Finally, if we allow pluralities in our universe of discourse, then plural singleton indefinites will exhibit less dramatic effects than their singular counterparts. Suppose I assure you that:
(29) If friends of mine from New York had been there, they would not have let it happen.
having in mind a particularly feisty subset of my New York friends who are socially conscious and who aren't afraid to stand their ground. There are two ways to view (29) in this context. We could say that the bare-plural is not a singleton but rather an existential implicitly restricted to the feisty friends and taking scope within the antecedent of the conditional. The other possibility is that this is a singleton plural existential again taking scope within the antecedent of the conditional, but the one element in the extension of the restrictor is a plurality composed of my feisty New York friends. In that case, we get namelike behavior with apparent unexpected scope outside the conditional, with the one difference to earlier cases that here we 'refer' to a plurality. This second way of looking at things actually seems preferable since the first way would mean that (29) allows that just one or two of my feisty friends, by themselves, would have stopped it, whereas the sentence can be read as saying that it's only the group of them that would have stopped it.
6
Having established some of the logical properties of singletons that aren't (singular) indefinites, we may now reflect on the fact that the non-indefinites are highly marked. There is something peculiar about examples like (24) and (26) and (28). In general, with the exception of indefinites, singletons are avoided whenever the parties to the conversation are aware that they are singletons.
7 Why should this be?
6 Here's a quantified singleton plural indefinite, based on Abusch (1993-4: (19)) i. Every purported miracle attributed to Moses would have been less impressive if now uncontroversial theories had been known at the time.
On the intended reading, for each miracle there is a possibly different group of theories, such that if those theories had all been known, the miracle's shock value would have been diminished. (van Geenhoven(1998:3.2.4) and others claim that bare-plurals cannot have specific readings).
7 Non-indefinite quantifiers don't all behave the same as the following contrast shows:
i. Most men named Alex Specladoro were harassed by the police. ii.
Noone named Turk Weston received an award.
(i) seems to imply a non-empty, non-singleton set of Alex Specladoro's running around.
(ii) implies the speaker is ignorant about the cardinality of the set of Turk Westons.
Unfortunately, I do not have an answer to this question. The best I can do is to say why I think some of the more obvious answers to this question are not entirely satisfactory.
Although they don't put it this way, Groenendijk and Stokhof(1980) express the view that singleton universals are blocked by the availability of definite descriptions. The intuition is that somehow it would be odd for a flight attendant to announce:
(30) Every pilot requests that you fasten your seat belt.
instead of:
(31) The pilot requests that you fasten your seat belt.
And if (30) were used, it would imply that there are several pilots on board. Here's an explanation of (30)- (31) inspired by Heim(1991: §2.1.3) . Since there is a unique pilot and since the singular definite presupposes that, we must use the definite. This is due to a constraint in the grammar, call it MaxPresup, which enjoins us, when faced with a choice between suitably similar felicitous expressions only one of which carries a presupposition, to choose that one. This would presumably cover (30)- (31), as well as negated universals or negative existentials where a definite is appropriate: This story is very likely true, but it has little to do with the generalization we are after. Notice, first, that a singleton indefinite is banned in this context as well (a pilot requests that…). Secondly, where singleton indefinites are allowed, definites are not required even though singleton universals are still infelicitous. MaxPresup couldn't explain the infelicity of the following examples under the interpretations and circumstances discussed above for (1) and (14): (35) Everyone at the party voted to watch every movie that Phil said was his favorite. (36) Most linguists have looked at every analysis that solves every problem.
The point is that MaxPresup, when it takes effect, blocks singletons of all types, except definites. Our generalization, on the other hand, which distinguishes the use of singleton So while most and other monotonic increasing quantifiers seem to favor a restrictor with cardinality two or greater, no doesn't. But no does share with the others its distaste for a restrictor known to be singleton.
indefinites from other kinds of singletons, could only apply in cases where MaxPresup is silent.
Another blind alley commences with the claim that languages disapprove of vacuous quantification (Kratzer 1995) . Since singleton quantifiers are not vacuous quantifiers, this will not explain why they are offensive unless they are existential.
Finally, there are difficulties with the idea that some quantifiers simply presuppose that their restrictors are non-singleton. If that were correct, then (24) above would be a case of presupposition cancellation. Adapting an argument from Abusch and Rooth(1998) , compare that case to one in which a true non-singleton presupposition is canceled:
(37) #Both members of the Italian department are happy with Bill's proposal since there is just one member of the Italian department and that's Bill.
(37) sounds contradictory, unlike (24) above. The contrast is unexplained if both involve universal quantification over a set presupposed to be non-singleton.
The best we can say at this point is that quantifiers of any stripe can be singletons and when they are, they display seemingly peculiar scope properties. For some reason, the set of contexts in which singletons are felicitously used is narrower for non-existentials. The source and nature of this restriction remains to be elucidated.
Having isolated those quantification noun phrases that dislike singleton restrictors, we are now in a position to separate out another potential source of 'referentiality' attached to some indefinites. Suppose in the midst of heated debate your colleague Weston erupts with the following declaration:
(38) Not every student who received a degree in our program actually fulfilled all the requirements.
Suppose that you correctly surmise that Weston has a particular student in mind. It is that student's record that justifies his announcement. Although it does not follow from this fact that the subject of (38) is singleton, it's not, this fact does play a role in the dialogue. As Kamp(1990:74) writes, "in many communicative situations we form beliefs and other attitudes that we intend to be about the same things as certain beliefs (or other attitudes) which we attribute to some other person". Given your understanding of Weston's justification for (38), and supposing you accept what he says as a belief of your own, you are likely to associate with that belief the commitment that it be 'about' the student Weston had in mind. That student therefore plays a role in the truth conditions of that belief, even if he doesn't enter into the truth conditions of Weston's utterance of (38).
The dialogue would not be much affected, if instead of (38), Weston had said:
(39) At least one student who received a degree in our program actually fulfilled all the requirements.
Again, we would have had 'referentiality' but without singletonness. Again, there is no indication that Weston wants to quantify narrowly here, moreover the meanings of modifiers like at least and exactly are known to inhibit the presence of a singleton restrictor (Liu 1997 ; see also Beghelli (1993) and Szabolcsi 1995,7) . But Weston does have a particular justifying instance in mind and that fact again could make its way into what is communicated to you. Nothing we have said would prevent the production of this kind of belief with the use of a simple indefinite either. What this means is that the grammar, very broadly speaking, allows for two ways for indefinites to be used 'referentially'. In one case the indefinite itself is just an existential quantifier, and the 'referential' quality comes from the justification for producing an utterance containing the indefinite. This is what Kripke(1977) called 'speaker reference' (see also Cormack and Kempson(1991) , Groenendijk and Stokhof(1981) , Kamp(1990:76) , Ludlow and Neale 1991) . In the second case, the indefinite itself is essentially namelike because it quantifies over a singleton domain. Neither one of these two possibilities can be eliminated in favor of the other, both because they arise from independent general principles of communication and grammar and because each does some work where the other is at rest. 'speaker reference' is observed with quantifiers that are not generally used with singleton restrictors. And as Abusch (1993-4) and others have pointed out, there are contexts where there is 'referentiality' but no speaker reference (such as in the antecedent of a conditional, where facts about one individual would not justify the truth of the utterance) as well as contexts where indefinites have unexpected wide-scope, explained by singletonness but having nothing to do with referentiality.
IV. Implicit Restrictions on Quantifiers.
Various people who have thought about singleton uses of indefinites especially of the kind discussed in section I have been struck by the possibility that they can be used in circumstances in which a listener understands the indefinite to be a singleton, yet he or she does not know what it 'refers' to. The term 'specific indefinite' is sometimes, though not always, reserved for such cases (see Farkas 1995 for discussion of the various uses of the term). Fodor and Sag's example illustrates this nicely:
(40) If a friend of mine from Texas had died in the fire, I would have inherited a fortune.
It is easy to hear (40) as being about a particular friend, even if you don't know who that friend is, except that it is the friend that was just talked about or the friend from Texas who if he had died in the fire, the speaker would have inherited a fortune.
Assuming the speaker to have several Texan friends and given the discussion in sections I and II, a friend of mine from Texas comes to be a singleton because it is implicitly restricted in such a way that it holds of just one friend. In that case, the intuition that the listener is somehow less than fully informed translates into the following roughly hewn principle:
It is possible for a felicitous utterance to contain an implicitly restricted quantifier even though members of the audience are incapable of delimiting the extension of the implicit restriction without somehow making reference to the utterance itself.
This principle is general. It is not restricted to singleton indefinites or even to indefinites in general. The phrase "delimit the extension" could probably be improved (see Kasher and Gabbay(1976) , Yeom(1997) ). The principle is meant to be neutral with respect to what we take an implicit restriction to consist of (sets, properties, predicates, etc.), though I am persuaded by Stanley and Gendler-Szabó(2000) to favor the property view, as will become clearer below. In any case, 'delimiting the extension' is not intended to require some positive identification of the elements of the extension, as in a police lineup. Knowing some defining characteristic suffices. In any case, what is important for now is the speaker-listener asymmetry, not the details of what each must know.
In order to better appreciate the claim that (41) makes, we might consider a view of implicit domain restriction that is incompatible with it. Suppose implicit domain restrictions worked like the semantics of deictic pronouns or indexical now. In a given context, some general rule would determine a set of individuals and that would serve as the implicit restriction when suitably combined with the meaning of the overt restrictor. If we now factor in (41), the analogy with deictic he or with now breaks down. It would be infelicitous to use deictic he in a situation where the audience could not tell who it referred to. Similarly, anyone who knows the definition of the word now could not hear it being uttered without knowing what time it refers to. There are certainly degrees of 'knowing what the time is' but I don't believe they include the kind of ignorance that is behind the principle in (41).
I would now like to argue this point more forcefully and persuade you that the indexical/deictic view is wrong and that implicit restrictors have properties from which the Privacy Principle could be seen to follow.
In the course of discussing the contextual determination of the comparison class of a positive adjective, Klein(1980: §3.1) argued that comparison classes and implicit restrictors on quantifiers depend on context in a way that is different from indexicals. On the advice of Ivan Sag, Klein adduced evidence for his claim from ellipsis contexts. Klein begins his argument with a sentence where an indexical that occurs in the antecedent of an elided VP:
(42) Jude drank some of that, and Leo did too.
(42) only allows interpretations in which the second elided that has the same interpretation as the first. Leo drank some of the same stuff Jude drank. Compare this to a sentence where an adjective is elided:
(43) This is comfortable and that is too.
Supposing this is uttered while pointing to a chair and that is uttered while pointing to a sofa, (43) can be used to mean that the chair is comfortable for a chair and the sofa is comfortable for a sofa. The implicit comparison class of the antecedent does not get carried over into the elided VP.
Klein continues by showing that implicit restrictors on quantifiers pattern like comparison classes and not like indexicals. This is illustrated in (44) below:
(44) Leo gave a bridge party at home yesterday and Jude took the kids swimming. Leo thought everyone had a good time, and so did Jude.
(44) seems to have the same interpretation as (45) below, where I have undone the ellipsis and I have made the implicit restrictions explicit:
(45) Leo gave a bridge party at home yesterday and Jude took the kids swimming. Leo thought everyone at the bridge party had a good time, and Jude thought everyone who went swimming had a good time.
From (43), Klein concludes "comparison classes can switch across VP deletion, while the reference of indexicals cannot." Here's an alternative view, inspired by the discussion in Reimer(1998) . An indexical, as Kaplan has taught us, is directly referential. The meaning that contributes to the first conjunct in (42) is just its referent and it's that referent that is carried over into the second half. Implicit parameters on the other hand contribute much richer information. In (43), the comparison class may be given by a parameter that is the same in both conjuncts, but it may be something like the meaning of the phrase "things of its kind". 8 Likewise, in (44), the common restrictor may be something like the meaning of "at their event". In section II, we noted that implicit restrictors sometime behave like expressions containing bound variables. So in any case, we cannot be satisfied with sets or even simple properties as giving the contribution of implicit restrictors. And the same goes for comparison classes. As Stanley(2000) observes, the sentence: It seems then that when we speak of an implicit parameter we speak of some fairly rich content that is 'determined by context'. This is nothing near as straightforward as in the standard indexical case. Not only is there no simple definition like with now, or auxiliary pointing like with deictic he, but there isn't even a particular antecedent expression in the discourse that expresses the content. Whatever the implicit restriction or restrictions are for the quantifiers in (44), determining these restrictions is a sophisticated business. This alternative view requires a terminological adjustment. The term 'comparison parameter' will be used for whatever is fixed by context, while the 'comparison class' is the extension of the particular setting for this parameter. 'Implicit quantifier restriction' refers to what is fixed by context.
What we have so far is the idea that implicit parameters are determined in complex ways and can be sensitive to other elements in the sentence. What I'd like to show now is that one of the ingredients is reference to the thoughts of others.
Suppose I inform you that:
(48) The American Cancer Society predicted then in the next decade fewer women would have colon cancer than men.
You might ask me how I know this is true and I would tell you that I read it in the New York Times. But if you ask me whether (48) is a statement about women in general or just American women, I could not tell you. All I know about the implicit part of the restriction for the quantifier fewer is that it includes what the American Cancer Society intended when they made their prediction. Similarly, we find comparison classes specified in terms of the thoughts of others. Consider any of the following roughly synonymous examples:
(49) Bill Gates thinks that this book is not expensive, but I think that it is expensive. (50) I consider this book expensive. Bill Gates wouldn't. (51) This book is expensive, though Bill Gates wouldn't think it is.
(49) is true even though Bill Gates and I do not disagree on the price of the book. What we disagree on is the comparison class. In other words, in deciding what the extension is for the comparison parameter we need to consider Bill Gates' state of mind in the first half, and mine in the second. Quantified examples offer evidence that relativization to other thinkers is part of the content of the implicit parameter:
(52) Only three of the seven people I asked thought this car was expensive.
Again, the relative position of the car within the comparison class is not at issue, what is at issue is the choice of comparison class. The comparison parameter is bound by the subject quantifier.
Implicit parameters, at least the two we have looked at, can have their extension determined relative to the thoughts of others. This can have rather dramatic effects when combined with the use of a singleton indefinite. Consider the following variation on the Fodor and Sag example: (53) Nobody believed Ivan's claim that if a friend of his from Texas had died in the fire, he would have inherited a fortune.
Here neither the speaker nor the hearer can say who is being 'referred' to with a friend of his from Texas. The implicit restriction is relativized to the beliefs of a third party.
We are now only a step away from the Privacy Principle in (41) that we set out to justify. In fact, for the adjectival case, we already encountered the principle. Consider example (51) again, focussing particularly on the main clause:
(54) This book is expensive.
This could very well be uttered in conversation where the price of the book is already established. All that (54) establishes is that the book is significantly higher priced than others in the comparison class. What comparison class? Presumably the one determined by the speaker. The implicit comparison parameter in (51) has a content which is relativized to the beliefs of individuals. In the main clause it is bound by the speaker, and in the concessive clause it bound by the subject. For related facts about quantifier domain restriction, we turn to the following tale.
Me and my partner Fleisch went into debt; serious debt and to some not very nice people. I got an idea that I could sell that old fish farm I have back home and maybe raise a few bucks. I call a lawyer and she tells me: "You can only sell the farm, if all of your relatives die." Since I haven't heard about any genocidal maniacs recently, I give up on that idea. Meanwhile, I relate the story to Fleisch who is more desperate than I am. He asks who's included in 'all of your relatives'? I say I don't know exactly, but the devilish look in his eyes tells me I better go back to the lawyer to find out. The lawyer's use of all is implicitly restricted. I know that. Fleisch knows that. But exactly what the restriction consists of, only the lawyer can tell us. So when I hear the lawyer's remark and when Fleisch hears me repeat it, we both come under the Privacy Principle in (41). The only way we can say exactly what is being quantified over is to make reference to the lawyer's utterance: it's the people she had in mind.
It is this kind of circumstance, played out in the context of a singleton indefinite, that leads Fodor and Sag to declare that "in the typical case the hearer will not know exactly what the speaker is asserting". Scopal solutions.
In section V of "Demonstratives", Kaplan uses example (55) to illustrate "how rigidly the indexicals cling to the referent determined in the context of use: (55) It is possible that in Pakistan, in five years, only those who are actually here now are envied.
The point of (55) is that the circumstances, place and time referred to by the indexicals actually, here, and now are the circumstances, place and time of the context, not a circumstance, place and time determined by the modal, locational, and temporal operators within whose scope the indexicals lie."
He continues by entertaining the possibility that "this only shows that indexicals always take primary scope". In other words, we are to understand Kaplan's (55) as his (56) Kaplan's reply to this objection is that it doesn't provide an alternative to the idea that indexicals are directly referential, "since we may still ask of an utterance of (56) in context c, when evaluating it with respect to an arbitrary circumstance to what do the indexicals actual, here and now refer. The answer, as always, is: the relevant features of the context c."
There is a parallel to this discussion in the literature on indefinites. The peculiarities of singleton indefinites arise from special properties of the restriction on their domains of quantification. These properties lead to apparent wider than expected scope possibilities and so time and again the phenomenon has been analyzed purely as a question of scope.
10 I'd like to turn now to the most recent representative of this genre which seems to have begun with the discussion in Heim(1982) .
Within the context of a theory in which the contribution of an indefinite to logical form is a variable and a predicate with the quantificational force coming from elsewhere, Heim considers something like (58) as a logical form for (57) Heim rejects this analysis because the truth conditions it captures are too weak. Like (59), (58) is made true by the existence of something which is not a friend of mine. In place of (58), Heim proposes (60), which differs from (58) in the leftward movement of the indefinite to the 'topmost text' level, yielding truth conditions like those of (61) In later discussion (section 5.4), Heim suggests analyzing what I would call singleton indefinites with a rule (p225) that delivers logical forms like the one in (60).
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Subsequent researchers were troubled by the fact that Heim's rule violates otherwise well motivated constraints on movement. The project then became to achieve (with some exceptions) the same truth conditional goal as Heim, but through more sanitary means.
But here is where the parallel with Kaplan comes in. While Heim does not see in the 'wide-scope reading' of (57) an existential quantifier quantifying over a singleton domain, she does perceive the domain of her existential in (58) to be too inclusive and she rejects it on that basis. In (60), the problem is ameliorated, but it is not solved. If we take the domain of the quantifier in (60) to include all of my friends, then it is still too inclusive, though the results are admittedly less dramatic than in (58). With no further restrictions, (60) like (61) would be made true by any friend of mine who happens not to arouse interest in cats, perhaps because he simply never encounters them. But this doesn't capture the intuition that (57) on the intended reading is about that special friend who gets from me whatever cat likes her. The point is not as clear as might be, given certain properties of this example. To overcome this, we will look at a number of examples from the literature that followed Heim where the facts are a little clearer. In doing so, it will be important to keep in mind the claim that is being made about Heim's example. If the domain of quantification for the existential over friends in (57) includes all of my friends, then the truth conditions come out wrong. If, on the other hand, the existential over friends has a singleton restrictor, the wide-scope analysis in (60) will not produce incorrect truth conditions, so it is not wrong, it is just unnecessary.
Reinhart and Winter discuss the following example from Ruys(1992) . (62) If three relatives of mine die, I will inherit a house.
(62) "can be construed as talking about three specific relatives of mine" (Reinhart 1997:367) . As Winter(1997:415-16) suggests, it may be used to talk about three uncles who jointly own a house and who all must die for the house to be passed on. I take it that similar statements could be made about the following variant of (62): (63) If three relatives of mine died this year, I will inherit a house.
The specific-relatives construals of (62) and (63) are certainly possible, but they are not the work of a wide-scope existential indiscriminately quantifying over my relatives. (63) on the 'specific' reading could very well be false (if the uncles' will is invalid, for example), but it would be nearly impossible for the wide-scope paraphrase to be false: (64) I have three relatives such that if they all died this year, I will inherit a house.
Remember we are assuming that the indefinite quantifies indiscriminately over groups of three relatives of mine. Unless I have very recently inadvertently ticked off a fastworking genocidal maniac, it is a safe assumption that I have three relatives who did not die this year. Their existence makes (64) true. The same reasoning applies to another type of paraphrase entertained by Winter:
(65) I have three relatives such that for each of them, if he died this year, I will inherit a house.
Winter rejects this kind of paraphrase because, he says, unlike (63), (65) would be false if two of the uncles died and the court failed to award the house. But of course (65) would not be false in this situation for the same reason that (64) wouldn't be.
Similarly, Reinhart(1997:362-3 ) rejects one analysis of the "wide-scope (specific) interpretation" of (66) (66) If we invite some philosopher, Max will be offended. because while (66) "is not a necessary truth", according to the rejected analysis of (66) (along the lines of Heim's (57)-(58)) it could not be false in "the present world". But again, wide-scoping of the entire indefinite will not help much here. Certainly there is some philosopher who will not be invited, a dead one perhaps or one we've never heard of.
Moving away from conditionals, we have an example from Farkas (1981): (67) John gave an A to every student who recited a difficult poem by Pindar.
(67) has a reading in which there is a particular poem whose recital yields a perfect score. But this reading is not captured by simply scoping the indefinite outside of the relative clause:
(68) would be true in the likely circumstance that there is some difficult Pindar poem that no student recited, regardless of what grades John assigned. But that wouldn't be enough to make (67) true on the intended reading. Cresti(1995:130-2(96) ) considers the example in (69) below and assigns it the interpretation in (70), consonant with her method for achieving wide-scope without movement 12 :
(69) Nobody believes that I have seen a certain Buñuel movie. [96, p130] (70) There is an entity x 3 such that: it is presupposed that x 3 is a Buñuel movie in the utterance world, and it is asserted that nobody believes that I have seen x 3 [and x 3 is a Buñuel movie in the utterance world].
Surely there is some obscure Buñuel movie that noone has seen and that nobody believes that anyone else has seen (if not, change the example). This movie will verify the truth conditions in (70), but intuitively has nothing to with the intended reading of (69).
Cresti carefully chose this example because it has no conditional and no universal quantifier. This helps to alleviate the suspicion aroused by earlier examples that what is at stake is vacuous truth, which one might be tempted to rule out by other means (but see Abusch(1993-4: §12 .1) and Cresti(1995:75ff) before succumbing to this temptation).
Up to this point we have concentrated on simple cases of singleton indefinites of the kind discussed in section I. But the same impulse to reach for a scopal explanation arises with quantified singleton indefinites. In fact this was a major engine in the quest for a clean scopal analysis. Here too the real issue is not addressed merely by assigning, in this case, intermediate scope.
According to Abusch(1993-4:94) , on the most plausible reading of (71) Every gambler will be surprised if one horse wins.
"there might be a specific horse for each gambler that he has bet on, and the gambler would be surprised if his horse wins." To arrive at this reading, Abusch first considers a logical form as in (72) The truth conditions for (72) are described and rejected as follows:
"for every gambler x, there is a y such that for every accessible future world w such that [y is a horse in w and y wins in w], [x is surprised in w]. The first bracketed clause is the restrictor for the world quantifier and the second is the nuclear scope. The first conjunct in the restrictor can be made false, and the formula as a whole made vacuously true, by choosing a y which isn't a horse in w.
For instance, if George Bush is not a horse in any of the worlds w that the quantification expressed by will ranges over, the implication is vacuously true. (p100). But surely there must be some horse which is not a winner in any of the worlds w that the quantification expressed by will ranges over. Candidate horses would include those that have not entered the race, dead horses and maimed horses. Any one of these will make the implication vacuously true for any and all values of x.
Much the same can be said for an example like the one discussed in section II:
(74) Most linguists have looked at every analysis that has been proposed for some problem.
The idea here is that most linguists have a pet problem and they have looked at every analysis proposed for that problem. To try to analyze this reading as the result of purely scopal mechanisms would be to quantify freely over all problems and assume an analysis captured by the following paraphrase:
(75) For most linguists l, there is some problem p, l has looked at every analysis that has been proposed for p.
Only the most sublime optimist (or pessimist, depending on how you view our work) could imagine that that there isn't some problem that noone has yet discovered. Call one of these undiscovered problems α. Since α hasn't yet been discovered, no analyses have been proposed for it, hence for any linguist l, it is vacuously true that:
(76) l has looked at every analysis that has been proposed for α.
And so (75) is necessarily true, but the same cannot be said for (74) on the intended reading. Once again, merely assigning unnaturally wide-scope doesn't do the job when a singleton restrictor is needed.
What is behind this impulse to reach for scope when faced with a singleton indefinite? While some have reveled in the sticky questions addressed in sections III and IV, others recoil. Winter(1998) worries that "the alleged 'pointing gesture' [of Fodor and Sag, RSS] is supposed to be a 'private' one, so how can we falsify this idea?" Reinhart remarks that accounts of specificity "rely on the author's feelings regarding which previous discourse is more appropriate for each of the readings they propose for the sentence or regarding the putative mental state of the speaker when he utters the sentence (e.g. the degree of his familiarity with the entity he talks about). All are, indeed, interesting and important pragmatic questions, but they are also highly undecidable." In a similar vein, Groenendijk and Stokhof(1980) write: "The notion of having a particular object in mind on the other hand is purely subjective, and therefore completely uninteresting from the viewpoint of conversation analysis. The subjective and therefore uncontrollable character prevents it from being defined..." This skepticism is coupled with the pitfalls of paraphrase. The wide-scope paraphrases proposed for singleton indefinites usually sound somehow right. That is because they are right, not because of the scope of the indefinite, but because the indefinite is a singleton indefinite in the paraphrase as well. Perhaps it is their placement in topic position that brings out the specificity and hence makes the singleton reading stand out. The problem is that the paraphrase itself is then misanalyzed. Its key ingredient never makes it into the analysis it is meant to motivate.
VI Kratzer(1998) . Lexical Ambiguity.
Kratzer(1998) offered a non-quantificational analysis of 'wide-scope' indefinites which grew out of the search for a legitimate way to achieve wide-scope without syntactic movement. Reinhart(1995) 's way of doing that used choice functions: methods for choosing an element from a set. The core idea is captured in the paraphrase in (78) of the reading of (77) that speaks about a particular philosopher:
(77) If we invite some philosopher, Max will be offended. (78) There is some method for choosing one element from a set, call it f:
if we invite the result of applying f to the set of philosophers, Max will be offended.
For reasons having to with the distribution of the various kinds of 'wide-scope' readings, Kratzer proposed instead to leave the variables over choice functions unbound allowing their values to be determined by context. For (77) she would have (79):
(79) if we invite f(philosopher), Max will be offended.
where the intended value for f is a function that chooses the particular philosopher from the set. Extending this idea slightly, for (80) she would have (81), where f x is a function from individuals to choice functions. On the reading discussed in section II, the contextually supplied value for f would be a function from individuals to functions from the set of all problems to the problem worked on most by that individual.
Sections I and II of this paper can be thought of as an attempt to derive Kratzer's system from other elements in the grammar. Whereas I believe that 'wide-scope' indefinites are just the result of independent properties of the grammar, for Kratzer, they are specialty items that arise from a lexical ambiguity. Indefinites on that account can be quantificational or not. In the latter case, the determiner or the indefinite article denotes a choice function.
The differences between the two views can be elaborated in light of the considerations raised in sections III and IV. In section III, we asked what happens when the restrictions of other quantifiers become singleton. On the ambiguity account, one asks why it is that across languages it is just the indefinite determiners that display this ambiguity and that it furthermore extends to languages that don't have an overt indefinite determiner. The determiner no makes the difference between the two approaches plain. As noted earlier, when no goes singleton, it behaves like a name in a negated proposition. On the other hand, if no had a choice-function interpretation, it would simply act like a wide-scope indefinite. On this interpretation, no son of mine lives in the East Village would just amount to an assertion, concerning some son of mine, that he lives in the East Village.
Section IV was concerned with the intuition that specific indefinites engender an asymmetry between the information a speaker puts into his utterance and the information a hearer gets out of it. On the ambiguity account, indefinite articles can be pronominal elements denoting choice functions. The choice functions are "contextually determined, often intended by the speaker but not revealed to the audience." (Kratzer 1998:167) . This means that the content of an explicit expression is being determined in such a way that some parties to the conversation are cut out of the negotiations. This state of affairs runs counter to the general thrust of the discussion in section IV above. There it was supposed that only implicit parameters can depend on beliefs and intentions in such a way as to allow for apparent speaker-hearer misalignment. If that hypothesis is correct, then the denotation of an overt pronoun would have to be determined publicly, as is the case with lexically unambiguous pronouns. As noted in section IV, deictic he is infelicitous if a listener cannot make out who is being referred to. Perhaps closer to home are pronouns of the kind described in Cooper(1979b) . These are pronouns that denote functions which have bound variable arguments. This is quite close to the interpretation proposed for some in (80). But even if we do not have a full account of how the functions are determined in the Cooper examples, they always seem to require an antecedent of some sort. I cannot, out of the blue, say every child will get it intending to convey that for each child, there is a thing I have in mind for them, and they will get it (on this point see also Enç 1991) .
There are other possible ramifications to the choice of grammatical underpinnings of 'wide-scope' indefinites. Technically, 'wide-scope' indefinites are existentially quantified expressions on the view set out in this paper, while for Kratzer they are demonstratives. Grammatically, even wide-scope, specific indefinites are known to pattern like other indefinites and not like demonstratives in there insertion contexts (Fodor and Sag, Enç) , in terms of understood non-coreference with previous expressions in the discourse (Liu (1997:31) This data is of course only meant to be suggestive. Clear conclusions could only be drawn in the context of a particular analysis of the constructions involved.
VII. Specificity and grammar.
When the notion of singleton indefinites was first introduced in section I, I claimed that there is nothing remarkable from a grammatical viewpoint about an indefinite whose restrictor happens to have a singleton extension. This was not meant to exclude the possibility that some lexical items could encode singletonness. By analogy, we could introduce the term 'child-pronoun' to cover uses of personal pronouns that refer to children. There is nothing grammatically interesting about that subset of cases (for English, at least), still this idea could be lexicalized, yielding a pronoun that presupposed a youthful referent. Another possibility that was not excluded was that singleton indefinites may answer the call of a syntactically defined position for a narrowly constrained set of meanings. Rullmann(1989) seems to have discovered such a case in subject initial clauses in Dutch. The subjects of these clauses may be definite, whereas an indefinite subject usually requires the use of the er construction. Compare the embedded clauses in (85) and (86), noting the use of er in the felicitous example:
(85) ?? Ze zeiden dat een student was gearresteerd.
'they said that a student had been arrested' (86) Ze zeiden dat er gisteren een student gearresteerd is 'they said that a student was arrested yesterday'
One approach to this pattern, not Rullmann's exactly, is that the initial subject position is reserved for NPs that have a limited set of meanings. Definites comply with the limitation, indefinites usually do not. Suppose that that limitation was such that it was satisfied by an NP with a singleton restrictor. That would explain why definites are allowed, it would also explain exceptions Rullmann noted to the ban on indefinites (Rullmann 1989: 18) :
(87) ? Ze zeiden dat een student uit mijn klas was gearresteerd. 'they said that a student in my class had been arrested' (88) Ze zeiden dat een bijzonder vervelende student uit mijn klas was gearresteerd. 'they said that a particularly obnoxious student in my class had been arrested'
As the indefinite subjects in (85), (87) and (88) slide into singletonness, their ability to occur in initial subject position improves. This view of (85)- (88) avoids saying that een student and een bijzonder vervelende student uit mijn klas are members of different categories recognized by Dutch grammar. Rullmann's case is one among a variety of similar phenomena ranging from the assignment of accusative Case in Turkish (Enç 1991 ) to modification by a predication clause in Chinese (Huang 1987: 249 ) (see Yeom 1997: §3.1 for other examples).
In the realm of lexical semantics, there has also been a wealth of research that touches on singletonness. Determiners in various languages lexicalize some notion of specificity which may be identified with or at least satisfied by singletonness (Keenan&Ebert (1973) discuss Malagasy and Frisian, Matthewson(1999) discusses St'át'imcets (Lillooet Salish), see others in Yeom 1997: §3.1). Perhaps the clearest case bearing on singletonness in the lexicon of English is prenominal certain in expressions like a certain frog, certain boys and certain information. Sometimes called a 'specificity marker,' certain is often used to elicit singleton readings of an indefinite.
Let us suppose that certain is just a signal that the following phrase has a singleton extension. Imagine now that you are reading a logic text and come upon (89) below:
(89) Without a certain assumption about the logic, we will never be able to prove this theorem.
Assuming that the space of assumptions is large, the only way the phrase following certain could have a singleton extension is if it is implicitly restricted. Given the discussion in section IV concerning implicit parameters, this restrictor could fall under the Privacy Principle, meaning that you, the reader, are not expected to be able to elaborate on what assumption (89) is concerned with. This accounts for the oft-made claim that certain indicates privacy. As noted in section IV, the Privacy Principle can blanket the speaker as well when an implicit restrictor is relativized to an individual whose attitudes are being reported, as in Higginbotham(1987:65) (92) If a certain box is missing from the pantry, you can be pretty sure that John was here.
The implicit restriction on box in this case is relative to the speaker, so it would be hard to see what the shared uniquely defining property is for this box. I would propose instead that certain is a parenthetical element, along the lines of speaker oriented adverbs like frankly. It is used to assert 'outside' the main proposition that the restrictor, implicit and explicit parts together, has a singleton extension. Like other parenthetical modifiers it occurs either in a different plane (McCawley 1982) or at least very high up in the string of adjectives, hence it cannot be preceded by other adjectives in the noun phrase.
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It is interesting to note that as a marker of a singleton restriction, certain is a nearantonym of any which widens the interpretation of the following phrase, according to Kadmon and Landman(1993) . Given the discussion to follow, one might consider that certain is just the mirror image of any, narrowing the domain, instead of widening it, without necessarily requiring singletonness.
Our account of certain was crafted with the standard claims about that and related lexical items in mind. But this should not be taken as an endorsement of the standard claims. certain is a ubiquitous lexical item, especially in technical discourse. It is my impression, however, that in the majority of its occurrences certain does not behave as normally described. Following are some of the kinds of examples on which this impression was formed.
In the course of defending his claim that a certain is "relatively interpretively independent" and hence is "generally interpreted as having wide scope" Hornstein(1988) happens to mention a principle which says: (93) if one can obtain a certain interpretation for a sentence by adding lexical material to it that brings out that interpretation, then the original sentence without the added lexical material is ambiguous relative to this second interpretation. (p 107).
It is clear from Hornstein's discussion that there is no particular interpretation intended in (93). In other words, this occurrence of a certain does not take wide-scope relative to the conditional or the modal can. In fact, the fabric of Hornstein's prose would remain intact, truth conditionally at least, if certain were eliminated from (93).
13 I don't know what to say about the singular indefinite article in expressions like a certain two people. Positing a plural determiner a certain would leave the ungrammaticality of *a certain boys unexplained. One finds other uses of the indefinite article at the edge of a plural noun phrase in a good six people or a mere ten people.
It was Hintikka(1986) against whom Hornstein(1988) was defending himself. Hintikka, for his part, asserts that certain is logically prior to epistemic operators. But this too is another faulty generalization. Consider the following excerpt:
(94) My son knows about 1000 morphemes of English. As a linguist, I know that he learned those morphemes in a certain temporal order. I don't know what that order is, but I do know that it is characteristic of the learning experience of other children and that it reflects certain constraints that operate in the adult grammar.
Hintikka argues for his epistemic operator story by pointing out that (95) means (96) while (97) Similarly, against Hintikka's (95) , one hears such things as:
(100) I seem to remember that you had trouble with a certain student in the first year. Who was that?
Finally, Hawkins(1978:207) endorses the viewpoint alluded to above according to which "the addition of the modifier certain also acts as an indication to the hearer that the speaker has a particular referent in mind". This is falsified by several of the above occurrences of certain, as well as the following quote from Christopherson in Hawkins' book (p100):
(101) "…It may be something else that one is familiar with, but between this 'something' and the thing denoted there must be an unambiguous relation. Talking of a certain book, it is perfectly correct to say 'The author is unknown'."
At this point we are faced with the following three questions. (a) What mechanisms are at work in the cases where the generalizations are justified? (b) What mechanisms allow for the cases where the generalizations are falsified? (c) What determines the choice among these mechanisms? Assuming that certain just indicates a singleton domain, question (a) amounts to the question of how singleton restrictors can give rise to apparent wide-scope and referentiality. Since that has been addressed already, we will move directly to question (b) to which I will offer two partial answers. Question (c) will remain open.
Consider a simplified version of (94): (102) I know that my son learned those morphemes in a certain temporal order.
By hypothesis, a certain temporal order is implicitly restricted in such a way that it quantifies over a single order. Suppose the restriction was given by the property of being the unique temporal order in which children learn those morphemes. That wouldn't commit one who uttered (102) to knowing what the order is anymore than (103) would:
(103) I know that my son learned those morphemes in the unique order in which children learn those morphemes.
The key here is that implicit restrictors may be properties and that I may know a property has a singleton extension, without knowing much about the entity occupying that extension. Similar remarks apply for the second occurrence of certain at the end of (94). This renders certain superfluous, at least as far information conveyed to a listener is concerned. It is puzzling why anyone would use it, in that case. As I said, question c. will remain open. Note that nothing we have said would prevent the property that implicitly restricts a singleton indefinite from being a property mentioned later in the clause. That means (104) Ortcutt believes a certain spy is the tallest spy could actually mean Ortcutt believes that a spy who is taller than any other spy is the tallest spy. It doesn't follow that Ortcutt believes of a certain spy, that he is the tallest. In a propositional attitude context, 'de-re' and 'specific' usually go together but they aren't quite the same thing. A de-re reading requires a stricter kind of acquaintance relation. That is why Hintikka's claims about certain are too strong. In (102), the use of certain does not add to the communicated content, because the hearer happens not to know exactly which property restricts the indefinite. Conversation is not impeded by this lack of information. This is partly because (102) is a declarative and so the particular verifying instance isn't crucial. If instead a question or an imperative were used, it would matter. It would be hard to follow the directive in (105) or answer the question in (106), assuming you didn't know which order or which morphemes were at stake: (105) Present these morphemes to the child in a certain temporal order! (106) Which order are certain morphemes learned in?
Consider now a pared down version of Hornstein's (93) , which like the Hawkins' quote is a generic statement: (107) if one can obtain a certain interpretation for a sentence by adding material to it, then the sentence had that interpretation to begin with.
In a move reminiscent of Hintikka's discussion, we might imagine a functional implicit restriction of the certain indefinite. The function, f, would relate situations to the unique sentence interpretation they contain. In other words, we have generic quantification over situations s, such that: (108) s is a minimal situation in which one obtains an interpretation for a sentence by adding material to it and that interpretation is just f(s)
This is roughly what we would get even without certain on a theory of quantification over situations that makes use of minimal situations (von Fintel 1994) . The net result is again a licit but superfluous occurrence of certain.
VIII. Summary and Conclusion
In the past, linguists and philosophers have ascribed to indefinites referential interpretations and abnormally wide-scope interpretations. Our view is that these effects result from the neutralization of scope differences due to the normal workings of the grammar. The key idea is that quantifier restrictions can vary with context and that a special case of this is a restrictor that has a singleton extension relative to values of any bound variables it may contain.
Along the way we encountered a number of issues which are in need of further exploration. Perhaps the most difficult is the relativization of implicit parameters to something like belief states. This was illustrated with comparison classes and quantifier domains. Both are normally thought to be contextually specified, however, as we saw, things are not that straightforward. Reviewing briefly, it is common to say that the truth of this tomato is red depends on the class of objects it is compared with and that that class is determined by context. However, when we say that John considers this tomato red, the choice of comparison class seems to depend on John's beliefs. Roughly, what is meant is that John considers this tomato to be redder than the other objects he is comparing them to. Similarly, John believes that this essay will appeal to most students can mean very roughly that he believes that this essay will appeal to most students he is thinking of. There are of course well-known examples of parameters which when unembedded get set to the context and when embedded get set relative to a believer or a belief time or world. Tenses, when unembedded, are relative to the speech time and when embedded are relative to the time the believer took to be current. A similar pattern is found with possible world parameters. In these latter cases, the rule for arriving at the value of the parameter is more or less straightforward, and the embedding just serves to provide an individual relative to which it is set. In the case of tense, it is always 'the current time', either according to the speaker or the person whose attitudes are reported. The parameter setting rules for the cases studied here appear much less straightforward. The idea that the individual, speaker or attitude-holder, appears to lack adequate knowledge of the value of the parameter seems troubling. Perhaps this is only apparent. Further research is needed.
The other question which remains open is why indefinites allow singleton domains so easily whereas other quantifiers resist this option. Adopting the view that certain is an indicator of a singleton domain ( §VII), this question amounts to asking why it is ungrammatical to say every certain frog jumps or most certain frogs croak.
